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Abstract
We advance a new framework for investigating the dynamic effects of collusion.
In contrast to the standard reduced-form workhorse model, a structural vector auto-
regressive model with sign restrictions allows us to endogenize cartel action and to
distinguish unexpected market manipulations from other types of shocks. Utilizing
a newly constructed monthly data set for the copper market from 1882 to 2016,
we find that cartel action shocks have strong effects on price and output during
collusive periods. More notably, these shocks have lessening, yet quite persistent
impacts over the subsequent unwinding periods in which output damages dominate
price damages.
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1 Introduction
This paper measures the dynamic market effects of collusion in the global copper market
from 1882 to 2016. In contrast to much of the literature that uses the “workhorse” static
reduced-form pricing model, we are to our knowledge the first to advance a dynamic
structural model that accounts for the endogeneity of cartel action.1 We distinguish cartel
action shocks from other shocks, including copper supply shocks, demand shocks due to
the global business cycle, as well as copper market-specific demand shocks. As a result,
we are able to quantify price and output damages both during the cartel action periods
but also during the subsequent “unwinding” periods.
We build on a structural vector auto-regressive model with sign restrictions to set-
identify collusive action shocks.2 Our identification rests on the simple idea that cartel
action is more likely to emerge and can be sustained when prices decline and do not
increase. A shock that we interpret as an output restriction shock is assumed to have
a negative effect on the cartel’s output and the world’s output, which drives up the real
price. In contrast, we assume that a non-cartel supply shock also has a negative effect
on world copper output, which leads to increased prices and exhibits a positive effect on
the cartel’s output. The idea is that as prices increase, the cartel has less incentives to
restrict output and instead increases production ceteris paribus. As prices increase, each
1Our paper is at the intersection of industrial organization and time series econometrics. Data limita-
tions (e.g. entry and exit of firms) do not allow us to use a structural industrial organization model.
2Faust (1998),Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005) have pioneered this model, which has
become common in applied macroeconomics literature.
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colluding firm has a strong incentive to cease restricting output and cheat (Marshall and
Marx, 2012, p. 7).
Similarly, a positive collusive stock manipulation shock is based on the reasonable
proposition that it positively affects the real price, output and the cartel’s inventories.
This type of shock captures unexpected changes in cartels’ copper inventory to manipulate
prices. In contrast, a positive copper market-specific demand shock is expected to have a
positive effect on price and output, but a negative effect on the cartel’s stock accumulations
because the higher price discourages cartel action.
We apply the econometric model to a new monthly data set on global copper output,
prices, and cartel actions from 1882 to 2016. We also constructed a monthly global activity
index based on ocean shipping freight rates. This data set allows us to examine the effects
of subsequent periods of cartel action and to track their long-run effects.
We derive three key results: First, output restrictions damage consumers, while col-
lusive stock manipulations benefit consumers in the long run. Both lead to higher prices
during the collusive action period. However, stock manipulations lead to persistently de-
pressed prices in the unwinding periods more than offsetting the damage during the action
periods. Output restriction have only a small and ambiguous negative effect during the
unwinding periods. Second, output damage is more important than price damage. The
main reason is that collusive action has persistent effects on output beyond the collusive
action period. This could be driven by a negative impact on exploration and investment
during the cartel action periods. Finally, collusive output restrictions lower the future
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output path over the long run, while collusive stock manipulations leads to higher output.
These results suggest that output damage is more important than previously thought
in the literature due to its persistent effects. It should be a consideration in antitrust
litigation. Currently, courts in the U.S., the European Union and elsewhere focus only on
price damage.
In the following section, we present the relevant literature in section 2; in section 3, we
show the geographic and product scope of the copper market, in section 5 we introduce
the data set and in section 4 we cover the episodes of alleged collusion. We lay out the
dynamic structural model and the computation of the but-for price and output, as well as
the damages that take place both with regard to price as well as output levels in section
6. In section 7, we present and discuss our empirical results. Section 8 provides results
from a sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 9 is the conclusion.
2 Review of the Relevant Literature
The literature on the market impacts of collusion largely focuses on reduced form pricing
analysis. The workhorse in antitrust litigation matters is reduced form regressions. Baker
and Rubinfeld (1999, p. 392) note that “the price effect of the alleged conspiracy is
measured by the coefficient on a dummy variable that takes on the value of one during
the period (or in the markets) in which the conspiracy is in operation.” Recognizing the
heterogeneity that exists for individual transactions between sellers and buyers, Hartman
and Doane (1987, p. 352) propose a reduced form pricing hedonic approach that is capable
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of identifying and measuring “...the commonality in a group of apparently heterogeneous
products, services, or individuals.” Along similar lines, Brander and Ross (2006, p. 342)
advanced before and after comparisons, simply comparing “...the price before the price-
fixing conspiracy with the price that occurred after the price-fixing conspiracy became
active.” The before period is typically advanced as the control period in which non-
collusive prices are presumed to be generated. Other empirical studies have used the
post-collusive period as a benchmark, other product markets, and in some instances other
geographic markets which cover the same product or same service’s scope. (Connor and
Bolotova, 2006)
Prior empirical studies revealed that post-collusive prices likely have a different mean
and variance than the pre-collusive prices. Bolotova et al. (2008) study this in the con-
text of the citric acid conspiracy (1991-1995) and the lysine conspiracy (1992-1995). For
citric acid, the mean post-collusive price is 12% higher than the pre-collusive price. The
post-collusive standard deviation of citric acid is 55% lower than the standard deviation
of the pre-collusive price. With regard to lysine, pre-collusive and post-collusive prices
are similar but the post-collusive price standard deviation is 41% lower. The authors con-
clude that prices may or may not return to the pre-collusive price level and consequently,
using the post-collusive price as a proxy for the competitive price, may underestimate the
consequences of collusive actions. In the Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Bernheim (2002)
reaches a similar conclusion to the citric acid and lysine empirical analysis, finding that
prices gradually returned to pre-collusive levels over a 12 month period.
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There are several theoretical models that focus on tacit collusion under imperfect pub-
lic information. In the seminal paper by Green and Porter (1984), the model of perfect
collusion is impossible because of imperfect information. They identify several alterna-
tive equilibria, including that price wars (Cournot episodes) are essential in sustaining
collusion. A recent theoretical piece by Bos and Harrington (2010) provides insights on
the distribution of cartel members. They presume a direct relationship between output
and capacity of each cartel member. The distributional aspects make clear that larger
firms have more incentive to join the cartel than smaller firms. The policy insight from
their theoretical formulation is to restrict mergers that lie between the small firms and the
large firms, allowing those merged entities to act as larger firms would in being members
of the formation of cartels. Specifically, a merger between two moderate-sized firms may
significantly expand the size and profitability of a potential cartel.
Harrington (2004) presents the theoretical foundations for strategic collusion in the
post-cartel period centered upon U.S. antitrust policy. The model predicts that the post-
collusive price is higher when firms assign more weight to damages, the cartel has a longer
duration and the industry is more concentrated. The author conducts an empirical analy-
sis of the graphite electrodes cartel (1992-1997) and finds that two years after the collusion
presumably terminated, the price was still 20% above its pre-collusion level. Erutku (2012)
implements the Harrington (2004) formulation in the context of the retail gasoline collu-
sion in the province of Quebec (Canada). The author finds that the post-cartel price
actually increases (relative to the pre-cartel period) upon the filing of legal action, but
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then decreases as the antitrust case is slowly unwound.
Two surveys provide additional empirical results consistent with those outlined above.
In a meta-analysis, Connor and Bolotova (2006) find that the use of a post period bench-
mark underestimates overcharges when compared to other benchmarks (geographic or
product) by approximately 11% because collusive distortions persist after the disbanding
of the cartel. In a second survey, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) examine several cases
of known cartels focusing on duration, causes for cartel breakdown, and the degree of
impact. Regarding the impact on prices post cartel dissolution, the paper notes that there
are studies that show manipulated price elevations even following antitrust prosecution.3
Several studies that have examined market power in the copper industry inform the
specifications of our model. For example, Agostini (2006) examines the hypothesis of a
two-price system orchestrated by export quotas being implemented in the United States.
This had the effect of eliminating some arbitrage opportunities and degree of market power
by U.S. suppliers. In Luengo Morales (2015), there is strong evidence of market power
and strategic behaviors among firms participating in the international copper industry.
He computes an average Lerner index of 42 percent, which suggests a stronger degree
of market power. Another model examining the International Copper Industry has been
presented by Luengo (2019). He contradicts the results of Luengo Morales (2015) find-
ing no evidence supporting collusive behavior among producers in copper industry. He
3There are a number of potential explanations for the collusive unwinding period, including long-term
contracts delaying price adjustments (Bolotova et al., 2008), tacit strategies that allow some collusive
influence to persist (De Roos, 2006), high market concentrations (Harrington, 2004), imprecise dates that
signify the end of a collusive era (Bolotova et al., 2008), and cost structures that may reflect collusion
inefficiencies (Bolotova et al., 2008).
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suggests that the substitution effect of aluminum may be restricting any attempts to in-
crease copper prices. He finds the Cournot equilibrium is the most likely outcome of the
strategic interactions among copper suppliers. Guzmán (2018) investigates specifically
the last of the alleged collusive periods in our sample, finding that the cartel mechanisms
implemented was not cooperative and in effect, competitive, theorizing that the so-called
“trigger price mechanisms” could be welfare-enhancing because of the reductions in price
volatility without any changes in the average level of prices. In another study, Slade (2020)
examines one of our alleged cartel periods (1887-89) that has been characterized as the
Secretan Copper Cartel. She argues that the cartel was forced to acquire much inventory
to maintain high prices, which was accomplished through direct purchases of the physical
commodities in spot markets and sufficient amounts of future contracts. Ultimately, this
cartel period came undone and inventory stocks found their way back onto the market,
resulting in prices that collapsed to pre-1887-89 levels.
There have been a number of generic studies on market manipulation across various
world commodity markets, perhaps the best comprehensive study available is Pindyck
(1979). He specifies the market structures that are conducive to cartel behaviors. In a
subsequent study, Slade (1989) also examines the structures that are conducive as well as
those structures that undermine collusive conduct. She focuses on market arrangements
for various commodities and the factors influencing price and cost stability. She finds
that any byproducts generated from metal mining are often more sensitive than we would
expect to the price of the primary commodity (e.g. silver vs copper).
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These general commodity market examinations are followed by specific studies on the
global oil market. Branger et al. (2020) find that higher monopoly profits in the oil industry
attract investment in capital, which drives down marginal costs and stimulates long-term
growth in the economy, expanding global real economic activity in the long run. Asker
et al. (2019) focus on the implication of misallocation of production and any impacts that
might arise in regards to total factor productivity within the oil industry and the entire
economy over the period 1970-2014.
3 Geographic and Product Scope of Copper
3.1 Worldwide Geographic Scope of the London Metal Exchange
The copper price at the London Metal Exchange is well-recognized as an accurate repre-
sentation of the supply and demand forces throughout the world. The exchange is still
the principal market place that establishes prices (Schmitz, 1979; Slade, 1991; Wagenhals,
2012). There is ample evidence that copper trades within an integrated world market over
most of the examined time period from 1882 to 2016 (see Klovland, 2005; O’Rourke and
Williamson, 1994; Labys, 2008). This implies that price movements are approximately in
accordance with the law of one price across space.
Price levels differed due to transportation costs or trade barriers in earlier periods, even
though these two factors were relatively unimportant (see McNicol, 1975), particularly
when compared to, for example, steel or coal markets. Of course, during the two World
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Wars, the market temporarily halted due to price and supply controls (Backman and
Fishman, 1941; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). During the so-called two-price-system from
the end of the Second World War to 1978, there was the U.S. producer price and the
London Metal Exchange price (McNicol, 1975; Slade, 1989, 1991).4 However, arbitrage
between the two systems kept the U.S. producer price roughly in line with the London
price for the vast majority of the time (see Richard, 1978).
Unfortunately, historical cost data for the global copper market is sparse. As we could
not come up with an annual or monthly time series, we cannot include such a variable is
not included in the econometric analysis. However, Herfindahl (1959) suggests that the
cost has stayed rather stable over the period based on his examination of the market from
1870 to 1957.5
3.2 Product Scope
Copper has maintained a track record of broad use (Radetzki, 2009). It is an input either
in pure form or as an alloy to a broad variety of intermediate and manufacturing goods.
Main industries using the metal are electronic products, construction, machinery and home
appliances.
Copper can be substituted by aluminum, steel and plastic for certain applications.
Empirical evidence of the magnitude and the statistical significance of any cross-price
4There was also the exchange determined copper price at COMEX in New York but which was relatively
unimportant at the time.
5Stuermer and Schwerhoff (2015) provide a theoretical explanation for stable long run cost, namely
that depletion of high grade deposits is off-set by technological change in resource extraction.
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elasticities is weak or near zero for aluminum (Fisher et al., 1972; Richard, 1978) and
plastic (Agostini, 2006). We are not aware of any quantitative study regarding steel.
The irreversible character of substitution, which requires substantial capital investment
by manufacturers, may help to explain these results (Richard, 1978). It is therefore a
reasonable assumption that substitution of copper by other materials is not sufficiently
impactful to undermine manipulation of copper prices over the short run.
Copper mining has several by-products with low relative value. The most important
by-products in U.S. copper mines, namely gold, silver and molybdenum, were each only
five percent or less of the total output value.6 By-products vary by region such that price
changes for individual by-products may not affect global copper output (Agostini, 2006).
Due to its geology, reserves of copper are primarily found in a narrow range of countries,
thereby highly concentrating this market in terms of world production across countries.
The main producing countries are Chile, the U.S., Zambia, and Peru.
Entry into the copper market is rather difficult. There are long lead times for opening
and expanding mines due to exploration, high capital costs, infrastructure needs, the
extensive removal of rock (Wellmer, 1992; Radetzki, 2008). Cartels tend to not face much
competition from outsiders over the short-run.
6We source the output data for this exercise from Ayres et al. (2013) and prices from Stuermer and
Schwerhoff (2015). The data refers to the year 1982.
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4 Major Events of Collusion in the Copper Market
Over the course of the last two centuries there have been many attempts to cartelize the
world copper market. Unfortunately, comparable and consistent historical data on many
aspects of these cartels is not available. This is particularly true for the entry and exit of
individual cartel members, cartel enforcement mechanisms and discipline issues. Section
C in the appendix provides a detailed characterization of the eight treatment periods.
To assemble a monthly data set on periods of alleged collusion, we first assessed all
of the narrative evidence from the literature and data sources, identifying 14 periods of
potential collusion in the copper market. We excluded those periods, where we could find
narrative evidence that cartels did not have a significant impact due to a small world
market share (e.g. Lakes copper producers’ selling pool 1870-1886), collusion was not
successfully achieved (e.g. the attempts of an agreement between European and U.S.
producers in 1895), or cartels had only a negligible effect according to narrative evidence
(e.g. output restriction by several U.S. producers in 1908) Herfindahl (see 1959). Given
those exclusions, we have nine treatment periods in our sample, but for one of these, price
manipulations by large U.S. producers in 1912 and 1913, there is no information on the
degree of output restrictions. Elliott et al. (1937, p. 399) characterizes this episode as only
a modest essay in price manipulation. Hence, we are left with a total of eight treatment
periods, which are recorded in Table 1, along with actions pursued by the alleged cartel.
Insert Table 1 about here.
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The collusive action periods begin with the Secrétan Copper Syndicate (1887-1889)
and evolve through different international cartel agreements and associations lasting from
the end of the 19th century to the interwar period, and end with the Intergovernmental
Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), which existed from 1967 to 1988.
We distinguish between the official start and end dates of the cartels and that of alleged
cartel action. We make this distinction because cartels are often formally in place for a
long time, but they do not engage in cartel action over the entirety of their lifespan. For
example, CIPEC served as a forum for discussion during most of its existence, but only
took collusive action from late 1974 to 1976. Overall, there were cartels in place nominally
during most of the sample period, except for the time period after 1990.
Most cartels were orchestrated by dominant firms. The only cartel involving govern-
ments was the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries, which imposed
output restrictions from 1974 to 1976. The cartels in our sample differ in their legal status.
Some were legal but acted in secret at first like the Secretan Copper Syndicate. Others
were legal and operated openly. For example, the Copper Export Association was based
on the Webb-Pomerene Act, which exempted certain exporters’ associations from some an-
titrust regulations. Finally, some cartels were partially illegal, as U.S. firms faced antitrust
regulations while some other international member firms did not (e.g. the International
Copper Cartel).
Cartels in our sample used two main instruments to manipulate prices, namely output
restrictions and stock accumulations. Output restrictions decrease copper production by
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either imposing production quotas or export quotas. Stock accumulations function through
a centralized agency that purchases copper from the market or from cartel participants,
and stockpiles copper until the right conditions arise for selling it.
5 Data Set: Prices, Output and Freight Rates
We collect monthly data for cartel actions, global copper output, prices and freight rates
from January 1882 to December 2016.7
5.1 Cartel Action Variables
We collected data on the cartels’ quantities of output for the majority of collusive action
episodes from primary and secondary sources. Where this was not possible, we compute
these quantities based on information about announced quotas and base years. The largest
announced output restrictions were made in the 1920s and 1930s.
The data on cartels’ stock holdings of copper are realized holdings during all examined
periods. These stocks were held by a centralized institution or a designated firm, which
made cheating by participants difficult and provides us with records of their stocks.
We transform the data such that it shows how world copper supply (more precisely
the total quantity put on the market) would have changed as a percentage change due to
the change in the respective cartel’s output alone. We also compute the percent change
in the cartel’s copper stocks in relation to world copper output.
7We refrain from including more recent data at this point. Global copper output data is subject to
revisions for several years.
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There are two reasons for doing so: First, the level of world output has strongly
increased over time, which changes the size of collusive actions relative to the size of the
market. By our transformation, we can account for this. Second, we regress the variable
on percentage change in total world output.
We normalize the variables so that an increase in stocks or a decline in output increases
the price of copper. Figure 1 depicts the two cartel action variables and the other endoge-
nous variables in our regression. Outside of the cartel action periods the two variables
take on zero entries.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
5.2 Real Price Data
Spot price data for standard contracts at the London Metal Exchange come from the
Metallgesellschaft AG, the American Metal Market Company, the U.S. Geological Survey
and others (see online-appendix). We make sure that changes in contracts do not lead to
jumps in the price series. We convert London prices in Pound Sterling to U.S. Dollar using
exchange rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We also collected New York
price data for the sensitivity analysis. We deflate both price series before 1912 with the
U.S. general price index from the National Bureau of Economic Research and afterward
with the U.S. consumer price index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.8. Detailed
8U.S. producer price data is only available starting in 1912. Using these data, would introduce a break
in our time series.
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data-description and sources are available from the authors upon request.
5.3 Global Copper Production Data
For the period from January 1882 to Devember 1993, we derive a monthly measure for
global copper production based on monthly data for almost all of the important producers.
Using indicator series for this subset of producers, we employ a Kalman filter and dis-
aggregate global annual copper production from Stuermer (2018) to monthly frequency
following Durbin and Koopman (2012) (see the online appendix for more details). Please
see the online appendix for more details.
We use International Copper Study Group data from January 1994 to December 2016.
Our series refers to the copper content of smelter production until 1929 and to refined
production thereafter. Output includes copper from mining production and recycling.
5.4 Real Ocean Freight Rate Index
To help identify demand shifts in global commodity markets, we develop a real ocean
freight rate index over the sample period. It is widely accepted that world economic
activity is the most important determinant of demand for transport services and to certain
extent, a proxy for global business cycles (see also Klovland, 2005; Stopford, 2009; Isserlis,
1938; Tinbergen, 1959; Kilian, 2009, 2019)). As discussed by Kilian and Zhou (2018), there
are many measures of global real activity and some are more appropriate than others
for modeling industrial commodity markets. Alternative measures have been proposed
16
based on world industrial production (e.g. Baumeister and Kilian, 2014; Hamilton, ming),
commodity prices more broadly (Alquist et al., 2020; Delle Chiaie et al., 2017; West and
Wong, 2014), global steel production (Ravazzolo and Vespignani, 2015), or combinations
of variables (Baumeister et al., 2020). For the long time period examined here, a monthly
global freight rate index is the appropriate measure, as it also embodies an expectational
component of commodity demand and can be constructed at monthly frequency (see Kilian
and Zhou, 2018).
We collect monthly ocean freight rates for different agricultural, mining and manu-
facturing goods for routes from San Francisco, New York and New Orleans to different
locations in Europe until the First World War. Major sources are the New York Produce
Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco.
During the interwar period, we supplement data from the New York Produce Exchange
with several other transatlantic and global monthly freight rate indexes. For the period
after the Second World War, we use the dry cargo index provided by Stopford,9 which we
supplement by the Baltic Dry Index starting in February 1985. We aggregate the individ-
ual series following the methodology outlined in Kilian (2009, 2019). We deflate the data
using the U.S. consumer price index. We remove a polynomial instead of a linear trend to
better capture the non-declines in real ocean freight rates over this time period (see also
Jacks and Stuermer, 2020).
9Personal communication.
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6 Estimating the Dynamic Effects of Collusion
The purpose of our endeavor is to evaluate collusive conduct and analyze the resulting
market dynamics. We construct counter-factual“but-for”paths for price and output, which
illustrate how price and output would have evolved if not for the cartel (see Levenstein
and Suslow, 2006).
To our knowledge we are the first to use a dynamic structural time series model for
this purpose. The methodology makes it possible to identify the various shocks that drive
the price at any one moment and that might have an offsetting impact on price. We can
also distinguish these shocks from the price and output shocks sourced with cartel actions.
This allows us to deal with two notable problems in previous studies: intangible shocks
and reverse causality.
The available literature does not distinguish between shocks due to cartel action and
other shocks that might drive the price deviations from the “but-for” price (see Marshall
and Marx, 2012, p. 79). For example, a copper cartel was active during the Great Depres-
sion, which exerted upward pressure on prices. At the same time, there was a negative
demand shock exerting downward pressure on prices as the global economy slowed. A
reduced-form model cannot easily separate the positive and negative shocks on the price
here. It can also not account for the cartel action to be endogenous to price.
In our structural model, the effect of cartel output restriction shocks can be set-
identified and distinguished from the effect of other supply shocks, while a manipulative
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stock-accumulation shock is identified as an inventory shock and its effect is distinguished
from the effect of other copper-specific demand shocks.
There are four steps in our methodology: First, we specify a benchmark period and
the collusive treatment periods. Second, we compute the “but-for” price and output paths
based on a structural vector auto-regressive (VAR) with sign restrictions. Third, we com-
pute economic damages resulting from price distortions and market supply distortions.
Finally, we investigate the dynamics over the course of collusive action periods and un-
winding periods.
6.1 Specifying a Benchmark Period
We first estimate the effects of supply and demand on prices and output over both a
benchmark period, which is clean of collusive action, and the conjectured collusive periods,
while controlling for the effects of collusive action.
We make use of a five variable reduced form vector auto-regressive (VAR) model:
yt = A1yt−1 + ...+ Apyt−p +ΠDt + ut . (1)
We regress each of the K endogenous variables yt = (∆St,∆Rt, Yt,∆Qt, Pt)
′ on their
own lags p and the lags of all other endogenous variables. We incorporate two variables
that control for the effect of collusive action and account for the distinguishing attributes
of each period of collusive action: ∆St refers to changes in the cartel’s stock holdings and
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∆Rt denotes cartels’ output changes, as specified in the previous section. This is necessary
to obtain an adjusted benchmark period, which controls for the effects of collusive action.
To control for cyclical variation in global real economic activity, we include the index
of global real shipping freight rates Yt. We also add the percentage change in world copper
production ∆Qt and the real copper price Pt in real 2013 US-Dollar.
10. The matrix of
deterministic terms, Dt, consists of a constant, a linear trend (to control for a negative
trend in prices and possible linear trends in other variables), and monthly dummies during
the two World War periods and the 24 months immediately after each war period to allow
for global markets to reintegrate.
We include 24 months of lags, which is a standard in the oil related VAR literature
(see Kilian and Zhou, 2020). The K ×K matrices Ai, for i = 1, ..., p, entail the reduced
form coefficients. The vector of reduced form residuals ut is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed white noise. The covariance matrix Σu is assumed non-singular
such that ut ∼ (0,Σu).
6.2 Structural VAR Model
The simultaneous determination of prices and quantities is a major issue in studying the
effect of cartel action. For example, cartel action may affect prices concurrently that low
10The setup of the basic copper market part is motivated by the empirical literature on oil and other com-
modity markets (see Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Stuermer, 2018; Baumeister and Hamilton,
2019; Zhou, 2020; Herrera and Rangaraju, 2020). We transform world copper production to percentage
change, as common practice in this literature. As the real copper price series is already stationary, we
do not transform it by taking logs. This allows us to compute the economic damages without an ap-
proximation error that would occur otherwise. We have also compared the time series properties of the
price series in levels and in logs and did not find major differences in terms of variances, stationarity or
autocorrelation.
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prices trigger cartel action. To deal with this issue, we use a structural version of the VAR
model:
B0yt = B1yt−1 + ...+Bpyt−p +Π
∗Dt +B0ǫt , (2)
The matrix B0 governs the instantaneous relationship among the endogenous variables.
The inverse of this matrix B−10 is called the structural multiplier matrix, which relates to
the reduced form coefficients of the endogenous variables Ai = B
−1
0 Bi with the dimension
of Bi = 1, ..., p being K × K. The structural form matrix for the deterministic terms is
Π∗ = B−10 Π.
The K × T matrix ǫ is assumed to consist of serially and mutually uncorrelated struc-
tural innovations. It relates to the reduced form residuals ut through the structural multi-
plier matrix B−10 , namely ut = B
−1
0 ǫt, where ut = yt−A1yt−1−...−Apyt−p. These equations
allow us to express the mutually correlated reduced-form innovations ut as weighted aver-
age of the mutually uncorrelated structural innovation ǫt. The elements of the structural
multiplier matrix B−10 are the weights.
To estimate the structural multiplier matrix B−10 , we impose sign restrictions on its
elements. The basic intuition of sign restrictions in our setup is to search for different
random shock series that are admissible solutions for the unknown structural shocks given
the vector of reduced-form parameters. This depends on whether the implied structural
impact matrix satisfies the assumed sign restrictions. As a result, the parameters of the
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impact multiplier matrix are no longer point-identified but set-identified.
Sign restrictions allow us to identify supply and demand shocks implied by economic
theory. For example, a positive demand shock (exogenous shift of the demand curve to the
right along the supply curve) will increase price and quantity, whereas a positive supply
shock (exogenous shift of the supply curve to the right along the demand curve) will also
increase output but decrease price (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014).
Insert Table 2 about here.
The sign restrictions on the impact responses of cartel copper stocks, cartel copper
output, world copper output, global real activity, and the real price of copper are sum-
marized in Table 2. These restrictions identify five structural shocks, which we interpret
as a collusive stock manipulation shock, a collusive output restrictions shock, a flow cop-
per supply shock, a flow demand shock due to the global business cycle, and a copper
market-specific demand shock.
The first shock is intended to capture the respective cartel’s unexpected copper stock
manipulations. We assume that this shock positively impacts the cartel’s inventories, the
real copper price, and world copper output, but a negative impact on global real economic
activity. We leave the impact of this first shock on cartel copper output unrestricted.
We interpret the second shock as a collusive output restriction shock. We assume that
it impacts world copper output and global real activity negatively and the real copper price
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positively within a month.11 The effect of this shock on cartel inventories is unrestricted.
The third shock corresponds to the classical notion of a commodity supply shock. We
assume that an unexpected inward shift of the supply curve affects the world copper pro-
duction negatively, global economic activity negatively, but the copper price positively.
Following the logic that higher product prices rather inhibit cartel formation and encour-
ages cheating in existing cartels (see Marshall and Marx, 2012), we assume that a negative
supply shock leads to an increase in cartel output and a decline in cartel inventories.
Forth, we incorporate a shock to the demand for copper and other commodities that
is associated with unexpected fluctuations in the global business cycle. We label this as
a ’flow demand shock.’ To identify this shock, we make the assumption that a positive
shock leads to higher higher real activity, higher world copper output and higher real
prices. Following the logic outlined above, the shock is assumed to lead to an increase in
cartel output and a decline in cartel inventories.
Finally, we include a residual shock designed to capture idiosyncratic copper demand
shocks not otherwise accounted for. This could relate to shifts in the demand for above-
ground inventory due to forward-looking behavior or to other copper market-specific de-
mand shocks driven by changes in preferences or technology. For example, upward revisions
to the expected future demand for copper all else equal, will result in an instantaneous
shift of the contemporaneous demand curve for copper along the oil supply curve and lead
to an increase in the real price of copper. As the price increases, world copper output
and cartel copper output are assumed to increase and real economic activity to decline.
11We normalize all shocks to have a positive effect on price in describing these assumptions.
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Rising prices are a disincentive to cartel action and we assume that cartel copper stocks
decline.12
For the computation of the counter-factual price and output series and the damages,
we only use the cartel shocks during the cartel action periods.
This methodology allows us to distinguish between shocks due to cartel action and
other shocks that might drive, e.g, the price above or below the “but-for” price.13 We can
separate three different drivers for changes in supply: First, changes in supply that are
endogenously determined by e.g. a change in price. Second, changes in supply that are
driven by exogenous shocks, e.g. strikes or wars. Third, changes in supply that are driven
by cartel action. As a result, our methodology distinguishes between, e.g., production
cuts, which an entity might undertake as a reaction to lower prices and are not influenced
by any desire to undertake collusive action, and any changes in supply that are driven by
capturing economic benefits by means of collusive action.
Finally, based the methodology we can account for reverse causality between the differ-
ent endogenous variables and to model the instantaneous and long-run effects of structural
shocks on the three endogenous variables.
12The residual shock may also capture anticipation effects of cartel action. We went through the
economic history and contemporaneous journals of each cartel period and could only find evidence for
possible anticipation of the cartel action in three out of the eight cartel periods. We may therefore not
capture the full extent of price and output damage in our results. The residual shock may also absorb
potential exchange rate shocks, as parts of our sample involve currency conversion from British Pounds
to U.S. Dollar.
13To illustrate the advantages of our methodology, we present results based on the standard work horse
reduced form model, which does not control for the endogeneity of cartel action in the online appendix.
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6.3 Computing the “But-For” Price and Output Paths
Based on the structural model, a historical decomposition allows us to compute the “but-
for” price and output series, which are the counter-factual price and output series without
collusive action. We decompose the five endogenous variables into the contributions of the
accumulated effects of each structural shock and the deterministic terms. We can then
isolate the accumulated effects of the collusive action shocks on price and output. We
basically compute what the counter-factual price and output series would have looked like
when removing the effects of the cartel action shocks.
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where φi are the estimated reduced form impulse responses, which capture the re-
sponses of the endogenous variables to one unit shocks i periods ago. They are computed
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The matrix B−10 is estimated structural multiplier matrix of the endogenous variables
and Π⋆ is the structural form matrix for the deterministic terms. We denote variables that
are derived from the historical decomposition by upper tilde.
The first term on the right hand side of equation 3 contains the sum of the cumulative
contributions of the five structural shocks on each of the endogenous variables. The sec-
ond term is the contributions of the deterministic terms to the endogenous variables. The
last term on the right hand includes the cumulative effect of the initial states on the five
endogenous variables, which become negligible for stationary processes as t → ∞.
To construct the “but-for” price and output series, we implement four steps. We ex-
plain these steps in terms of an example, which is the cumulative effects of the stock
accumulation shock ǫ1,t on the price variable Pt, the fifth variable in our model:
1. We compute the respective structural moving average coefficient matrices θ51,1, ..., θT−1,
defined as θ51,t = φ51,tB
−1
0 .
2. We derive the structural shocks ǫ1,t = B0u1,t, t = 1, ..., T .
3. We construct a structural shock series that only includes the shocks during the cartel
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action periods, namely ǫAction1,t . The cartel action period is defined as the time from
the start to the end of the cartel’s output restrictions or stock accumulations.
4. We compute the following weighted sum for t = 1, ..., T , which represents the cumu-

















and the cumulative contribution of the stock accumulation shock ǫ1,t and the output re-

















We can now line-out how to compute the“but-for”price path P̃BF and output path ∆Q̃BF .
We do so by subtracting the cumulative contributions of the respective cartel action shocks
from the actual price series and the output series:











The “but-for” paths provide us with the counter-factual evolution of price and output
“but-for” the effects of collusive actions.
6.4 Computing Economic Damages of Collusive Action
We compute both price and output damages based on the two set-identified cartel action
shocks. Price damage refers to the surplus lost by consumers that is then captured by
the cartel due to higher cartel prices. Output damage is defined as the consumer surplus
that consumers forgo, as the cartel reduces the quantity of its output. The latter does not
include the loss of producer surplus. We therefore do not compute the entire dead-weight
loss.
As there are repeated sequences of cartel action and unwinding periods, we face the
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challenge that the resulting effects from a cartel shock from a prior cartel period contam-
inate the effects of shocks during a current cartel action period. What we outline in this
section is our implementation of two phases in separating out the effects of each realization
of a shock on the output and price for any period of our sample record.
In phase 1 we create a T×T matrix Λ̃SA,P with the cumulative effects of each realization







where i = 1, ..., T and j = 1, ..., T . Each row of matrix ΛSA,P includes the cumulative
effects of one realization of the stock accumulation shock ǫ1,t at time t on the real price
over the entire sample. It represents the counter-factual development of price if there had
been only this one realization of the respective type of shock.
In phase 2, we compute the total price damage from shock ǫ1. To do so, we construct
the price damage attributed to each realization of shock ǫ1,t during each time period by
multiplying each entry of Λ̃SA,P with the copper production Q. To distinguish between the
damage during cartel action periods and unwinding periods, we create a T × T matrix S,
which includes zeros and ones. Ones represent the respective cartel action period (e.g. the
Secretan copper syndicate) during which the shock was realized. The total price damage










We follow analogous steps to compute the total damage of the stock accumulation
shock on price during the unwinding periods as well as the total damage of the output
restriction shock on price during the action and unwinding periods.
The procedure for the computation of output damages is the same but with an addi-
tional step. Before computing the damages, we need to convert the entries in Λ̃SA,Q and
Λ̃SA,Q from percentage change to levels.
As output increases exponentially over the sample period, we control for the value
of output to obtain a comparable measure of economic damage over time. We therefore
report the total damage as a percentage share of the value of total copper output. We
also provide the so called “overcharge,” which is the average difference between the actual
price (or output) and the “but-for” price (output) as a percentage.
7 Empirical Results from the Structural Model
7.1 Estimation and Inference
We rely on Bayesian methods of inference, which are the most common approach in the
literature on sign-identified VAR models.14
We assume a conventional Gaussian-inverse Wishart prior on the reduced-form pa-
14For more details on Bayesian estimation of sign-identified VAR models see Kilian and Luetkepohl
(2017).
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rameters and an independent uniform prior on the rotation matrices. This allows us to
generate a large number of candidate solutions for the structural impact matrix B−10 given
the vector of reduced-form parameters, based on 20,000 draws from the reduced-form pos-
terior with 20,000 draws of the rotation matrix each. To do so, we follow Rubio-Ramirez
et al. (2010) and involve a QR decomposition using the Householder transformation to
generate matrices with orthogonal shocks. For each candidate solution of the structural
impact matrix B−10 , we compute the set of implied structural impulse responses. If these
impulse responses fulfill the sign restrictions, we retain the respective structural model.
To evaluated the posterior of structural impulse responses, we follow the procedure by
Inoue and Kilian (2013, 2019) and compute the mode (most likely model) and the joint
credible sets of the admissible structural models. These sets account for the dependence
of the elements of the structural impulses across the admissible models.
7.2 Structural Shocks
We derive two shock series, which we interpret as collusive action shocks: the collusive
output restriction shock series (red) and the collusive stock manipulation shock series
(blue), as shown in Figure 3. These two series are the shock series from the most likely
model among the admissible solutions, given the reduced form parameters and the sign
restrictions. We only consider the identified shocks during the cartel action periods and
disregard those during the other periods.15
15The complete five identified shock series, impulse response functions and the full historical decompo-
sition can be found in the online-appendix. We interpret the realization of shocks outside of the cartel
action periods as shocks to the expectation about cartel action. Some of these realizations may also be
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Our interpretation is that these shocks represent by construction the unpredictable
component of collusive action. This helps us to distinguish price movements due to col-
lusive actions from price changes due to other factors, such as demand or other supply
shocks. The output restriction shock is positive during some months, as cartels roll back
their action or members start to cheat. The inventory manipulation shock series is some-
times negative, meaning that the cartel reduces its inventories.
Figure 3 about here.
Impulse response functions in figures 4 and 5 show the effect of the two cartel shocks
on selected variables. An unexpected decline in the cartel’s output equivalent to about
two percent of global output leads to a persistent USD 200 increase in the real price of
copper. This type of shock first decreases global output but after about 5 to 10 months
global output rebounds, as restrictions lift or production outside of the cartel responds.
We estimate that an unexpected increase in the cartel’s inventories equivalent to a bit
more than 1 percent of world production, increases global output relatively persistently
by about 1 percent and prices by nearly USD 300 for about 15 months.
Figure 4 about here.
driven by measurement issues. We are not too concerned about these shocks outside of the cartel action
periods, because the variation of the shock series is much lower than during the cartel action periods. For
the output restriction shock series the variance is 8.6 during the cartel action periods and 0.7 during the
non-cartel action periods. For the stock accumulation shock the variance is 17 during the action and 0.6
during the non-action periods.
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Figure 5 about here.
7.3 The Effects of Collusive Action on Prices
Based on our model, we find that stock manipulation and output restriction shocks drive
up the price during the action period. However, both lead to moderately and persistently
depressed prices in the unwinding period.
Let’s have a look at Figure 6. The chart compares the actual price (black line) to
the “but-for” price without the accumulated effect of the output restriction shock (red)
and without the stock manipulation shock (blue). The “but-for” price show the counter-
factual development of prices “but-for”, or “without”, the effects of the respective collusive
action. To put it differently the “but-for” price is the price that would have obtained in
the industry if not for the cartel.
For example, around 1921 prices would have declined to an estimated USD 1,000 per
metric ton, if there had not been stock manipulations by the Copper Exporter Association.
During the Great Depression Period, prices would have even fallen below zero without
cartel action. However, we can also see that collusive action has depressed prices in the
following period, as the blue line is above the black one. This indicates that prices would
have been higher during that time without previous cartel action.
Figure 6 about here.
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Figure 7 shows how the two different types of cartel action affected prices. For example,
stock accumulations by the Secretan Copper Syndicate contributed to raise prices by more
than USD 2,000 from 1888 to 1889. However, the action then led to a depressed prices
until about 1900 in a distinct post cartel period when the stock overhang had to be drawn
down. This is a pattern that we see for all three stock manipulation periods.
Output restriction shocks also drive up prices during the action period and lead to
declining prices after the action dissolves. This is best seen during Great Depression.
Output restrictions by Copper Exporters Inc cushioned the strong downwards effects of
the negative demand shocks by raising prices by more than USD 4,000. However, during
some of the post-collusion periods we find a negative effect from these cartel actions.
Figure 7 about here.
7.4 The Effects of Collusive Action on Output
Our results show that output restriction shocks cause declines in production, while stock
manipulation shocks lead to increases in output. These effects are quite persistent.
Figure 8 illustrates how persistent the effects of collusive action shocks are on produc-
tion. The black line depicts the actual level of world copper production. Without the
accumulated effects of the collusive stock manipulation shock, the output level would have
been significantly lower (blue line), whereas without the effects of the collusive output
restriction shock the level of production would have been significantly higher (red line).
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The effects set in with the collusive action but then persist until the end of our sample,
leading to very long unwinding periods of collusive action.
Figure 8 about here.
Figure 9 shows this result through the lenses of the contribution of each type of shock
to output. The stock accumulation shock caused a significant increase in output, while
the output restriction shock does the opposite.
Figure 9 about here.
7.5 Price and Output Damages
Based on the estimated “but-for” price and output paths, we derive substantial price and
output damages during not only the action periods, but also the unwinding periods.
Our results suggest that output restrictions lead to large price damages. They amount
to USD -11.3 bn (in 2013 currency) during cartel action periods (see table 3). This
is equivalent to about -7.6 percent of the value of global copper output at the time.
The overcharge is a little less than 28 percent, meaning that output restriction shock
increased prices on average by that percentage during the cartel action periods. During
the unwinding periods, we estimate only a small and ambiguous effect of the output
restriction shock on price. The unwinding period goes until the end of the sample.
35
Table 3 about here.
Our estimated results suggest that the stock manipulation shock also has a quite im-
portant effect on price, leading to a total price damage of USD -1.2 bn during the action
periods. This amount is moderate, because the stock manipulations took place during
the earlier part of the sample, when the market was overall smaller. The price overcharge
is about 10 percent. During the unwinding periods, there is a small benefit, as stocks
unwind, lowering the price.
The two types of cartel action shocks lead to very different effects on output damage.
We estimate that output restrictions led to total output damage of USD -1.0 bn during
the action periods, which is less than one percent in terms of the value of copper output.
On average, cartel action drove down output by only 2.3 percent, although there is large
heterogeneity across the different cartel action periods.
During the unwinding periods, we estimate that the output damage sums up to nearly
USD -160 bn, which is on average 3.6 percent of the value of output during the unwind-
ing periods. On average, the output restriction shock decreased output by more than 4
percent during the unwinding periods. The effects of the output restriction shock are very
persistent and they accumulate over time.
In contrast, stock manipulations lead to moderately higher output (about 4.2 percent)
and a benefit of USD 0.6 bn to consumers during the action periods. During the unwinding
periods, these benefits are sustained and accumulate to an estimated USD 67 bn, which
is on average 1.5 percent of the value of output during these times.
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The 68% joint highest posterior density sets obtained from the posterior distribution of
the structural models show that the damages are imprecisely estimated for output damages
and during the unwinding periods. Measurement issues in the historical monthly data-
series for the cartel action variables may be one explanation for this result. Another may
be a gap in the theoretical econometrics literature on the estimation of time series models,
which include variables with many zero entries.
Overall, output restrictions lead to substantial price damages during the action periods
and even stronger output damages during the unwinding periods. In contrast, stock ma-
nipulations also lead to strong price damages, but these are more than offset by the benefits
from higher output. Output damages by-far exceed price damages in terms of 2013 USD.
Total damages during the unwinding periods out-weight those during the action periods.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
Considering the historical nature of our data, several alternative specifications and data-
sets yield qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when compared to our baseline.
We first checked for robustness to different specifications in the construction of the car-
tel output and inventory variables. In alternative specification 1, we use only decreases in
output and increases in inventories during the cartel action period and set all other months
to zero. In alternative specification 2, we include both increases and decreases during the
action periods (like in the baseline specification) but also use available information about
the quantities of output increases and inventory decreases during the unwinding periods.
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We check the for the robustness of results to including a different price series, namely
the New York real copper price in an alternative specification 3. There have been some
U.S. tariffs on copper, especially during the interwar period, and the two-price system
during post-second world war period, which could both affect results.
We revisit the sensitivity of results to possible structural change. We vary the sample
period and run a regression from the beginning of the sample until the end of the interwar
period (alternative specifications 4a and 4b). This is an important check, as cartels in
the second half of the sample were far less common and powerful than in the first one.
Especially, after the dissolution of CIPEC in 1988, there were no official cartel in place.
Finally, in alternative specification 5 we assume that the variance of the two structural
cartel shock series does not exceed a value of 0.5 during the non-cartel action periods.
This further suppresses cartel action shocks outside of the cartel action periods.
The result that output restrictions lead to substantial price damages but only minimal
and ambiguous damages during the unwinding periods is qualitatively and quantitatively
quite robust across the different specifications. The price damage during the action pe-
riods is about a third higher in alternative specification 1, which seems natural as the
specification leaves out upward adjustments to output made by cartels (see table 5 in the
online appendix) during action periods. The price damage during the unwinding periods
is moderately to substantially larger when using U.S. real copper prices (alternative spec-
ification 3, table 6), in alternative specification 5, and when using a sub-sample from 1882
to 1939. In the latter case, the period after the second world war with only very modest
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cartel action is left out and that’s why the damage seems relatively high compare to the
baseline specification (see table 8 in the online appendix).
The relatively high price damage from stock accumulation during the action periods
in our baseline specification is actually the lowest estimate across all specifications, but
the result holds qualitatively. During the unwinding period, the damage is relatively small
and ambiguous across specifications. The exception are alternative specifications 4a and
4b with the sub-samples until the end of 1939 and 1988 respectively, which likely can be
explained by missing outbalancing effect over the long-run (see tables 8 and 9 in the online
appendix).
The result that output restrictions lead to moderate output damage during the action is
qualitatively and quantitatively quite robust across specifications. The effect of output re-
strictions on damage during the unwinding periods is only qualitatively robust. Including
available information on cartel output changes during the unwinding period (specifica-
tion 2, table 6, online appendix) and using a shorter sample period from 1882 to 1939
(specification 4a, table 8, online appendix) result in substantially lower output damage
from output restrictions during the unwinding period. At the same time, using New York
copper prices (specification 3, table 7), using additional restrictions (specification 5) and
including only cartel output declines lead to substantially higher output damage during
the unwinding period.
The result that stock manipulations lead to moderate output benefits to consumers
during the action periods and substantial output benefits during the unwinding periods
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is qualitatively and quantitatively moderately robust. When including all information
about cartel action (alternative specification 2) and when using NY prices (alternative
specification 3), the benefits during the action period turn into moderate damages. Benefits
turn into large damages during the unwinding period when only using the increases in stock
accumulations (alternative specification 1).
All specifications show that the output damage is far larger than the price damage.
They all result in output damage being much larger during the unwinding period than
during the action period. The only exception from the latter is quite naturally specification
4a with the much shorter sample period. Earlier results based on annual data and vector
auto-regressive system with the cartel action variables as exogenous variables also confirm
these two key empirical findings.
9 Conclusion
Our analysis provides evidence of the dynamic market effects of attempted collusion in the
global copper market covering from 1882 to 2016. In contrast to the standard workhorse
economic model for evaluating the market effects of collusion, our dynamic structural
model not only endogenizes the formation of cartels, but distinguishes the cartel mar-
ket manipulations from other non-cartel shocks, including copper supply shocks, demand
shocks due to the global business cycle, as well as copper market specific demand shocks.
We accomplish this separation through the specification of a dynamic structural vector
autoregressive model with sign restrictions allowing the identification of collusive action
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shocks, separately from the other types of specified shocks. To our knowledge, there have
been no empirical attempts to separate market manipulative shocks from the other many
shocks that naturally take place over a long time series.
Our methodology tracks the dynamic effects of each realization of any cartel action
shock on the jointly determined price, output, and cartel actions. For each cartel episode,
we compute price and output damages not only during the cartel action periods but as
well over the course of each and every unwinding period.
Among our empirical results, we find that cartel action shocks have a strong impact
on price and output not only during the cartel action period, but also over subsequent
unwinding periods. A second major result is that output damages for cartel actions dom-
inate price damages. This outcome reflects collusive actions that had persistent effects
on output beyond the collusive action periods. From the two types of cartel actions, we
find that collusive output restrictions lower the output path over the long run while collu-
sive stock manipulations lead to a higher level of output. These combined results suggest
that antitrust regulations should focus not just on price damages but as well the output
damages that adversely affect consumer surplus.
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Table 1: Collusive Action Periods in the World Copper Market
Collusive Entity Action Period Actions
Secretan Copper Syndicate 1887-1889 Stock Accumulations
U.S. and European Producers’ Ass. 1892-1893 Output Restrictions
Amalgamated Copper Company 1900-1901 Both
Copper Export Association 1919-1922 Both
Copper Exporters Inc/Copper Institute 1930-1932 Output Restrictions
The International Copper Cartel 1935-1939 Output Restrictions
Production Cuts by U.S. Producers 1962-1963 Output Restrictions
Intergovernmental Council of 1974-1976 Output Restrictions
Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC)
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Table 2: Sign restrictions on impact responses in the structural VAR model. All structural
shocks have been normalized to imply an increase in the real price of copper. Missing
entries mean that no sign restriction is imposed.
Cartel Cu Cartel Cu World Cu Real Real Cu
Stocks Output Output Activity Price
Cartel Stock Manip. Shock + + - +
Cartel Output Restr. Shock - - - +
Flow Supply Shock - + - - +
Flow Demand Shock - + + + +
Other Demand Shock - + + - +
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Table 3: Economic damages derived from the structural model using only output re-
strictions and stock accumulations during cartel action periods based on the most likely
(modal) model. Results for the 68% joint highest posterior density sets obtained from the
posterior distribution of the structural models are in brackets.
Price Damage Output Damage
Output Restr. Stock Manip. Output Restr. Stock Manip.
Action Periods
Damage in bn 2013 $ -11.3 -1.2 -1.0 0.6
[-15.8, -0.1] [-7.4, -0.2] [-5.7, 0.3] [-0.7, 2.7]
Damage in % of Output -7.6 -6.4 -0.7 2.9
[-10.6, -0.1] [-38.9, -0.7] [-3.8, 0.2] [-3.6, 14.2]
Overcharge 27.7 9.5 -2.3 4.2
[0.7, 48.8] [0.9, 55.0 ] [-14.2, 0.6] [-5.3, 20.0]
Unwinding Periods
Damage in bn 2013 $ 0.8 8.5 -157.5 67.2
[-253.3, 52.1] [-84.8, 42.0] [-1439.8, 219.8] [-391.2, 266.9]
Damage in % of Output 0.0 0.2 -3.6 1.5
[-5.8, 1.2] [-1.93, 1.0] [-32.9, 5.1] [-8.9, 6.1]
Overcharge 1.7 -1.2 -4.3 3.1
[-4.6, 13.3] [-7.0, 9.1] [-34.1, 5.3] [-13.6, 14.8]
B Figures
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Figure 1: Endogenous variables in the regression.
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Figure 2: Cartel Price and Output Damage to Consumers.
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Figure 3: This chart shows the two cartel action shocks, namely the output restriction
shock (red) and the stock manipulation shock (blue), during the collusive action periods
(grey areas). The two shock series are based on the most likely model and the shocks
identified during action periods only.
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Figure 4: Selected Sign Identified Baseline Model Impulse Response Functions for the Ef-
fect of the Output Restriction Shock on Cartel Inventories, Cartel Output, Global Copper
Output and the Real Copper Price in the Modal Model and 68% Joint Highest Posterior
Density Regions.
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Figure 5: Selected Sign Identified Baseline Model Impulse Response Functions for the
Effect of the Stock Accumulation Shock on Cartel Inventories, Cartel Output, Global
Copper Output and the Real Copper Price in the Modal Model and 68% Joint Highest
Posterior Density Regions.
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Figure 6: This chart compares the actual real price of copper (black line) to the computed
but-for prices without the accumulated effects of the collusive output restriction shock
(red line) and the collusive stock manipulation shock (blue line). Grey shaded areas mark
collusive action periods.
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Figure 7: This chart shows the contribution of collusive action shocks, namely the output
restriction shock (red line) and the stock manipulation shock (blue line) in explaining the
price of copper in 2013 US-dollar. Grey shaded areas mark collusive action periods.
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Figure 8: This chart compares the actual level of monthly world copper production (black
line) to the “but-for” output without the effects of the collusive stock manipulation shock
(blue line) and the output restriction shock (red line). Grey shaded areas mark collusive
action periods.
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Figure 9: This chart shows the contribution of each collusive action shock, the output
restriction shock (red line) and the stock manipulation shock (blue line), in explaining the
level of copper output. Grey shaded areas mark collusive action periods.
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C Periods of Collusive Action in the World Copper
Market
C.1 Secretan Copper Syndicate
Cartel Period: Oct 1887 - Mar 1889 (Andrews, 1889, p. 508)
Output Restrictions: None
Stock Accumulations: Oct 1887 - Feb 1889 (Andrews, 1889, p. 508)
Inducement: The syndicate was encouraged by similar action in tin markets (Andrews,
1889, p. 508; Richter, 1927, p. 258). It also seemed “a propitious time” as consumption
was growing faster than production (Andrews, 1889, p. 508; Richter, 1927, p. 258).
Functioning: Slade (2020) provides a detailed account of the syndicate’s inner work-
ings. It was a group of copper consumers (the Societe) and investors, which agreed with
major producers to purchase a specified maximum amount of production at a fixed price
over a period of years (see Herfindahl, 1959, p. 74 and Andrews, 1889, pp. 508-10). There
was no agreement to curtail production, but agreements to purchase quantities that were
greater than the mines’ production in the previous year (see Slade, 2020).
Quantities of Stock Accumulations: The syndicate began to make large purchases of
copper in October 1887. It bought nearly the entire stock of chili bars in London, and
as much copper as they could obtain in the U.S. (Rothwell and Rossiter, 1887, p. 67).
The syndicate controlled 40,823 metric tons of Chili bars by the end of November 1887
(Day, 1888, p. 67). As we are not sure when purchases actually started in October 1887,
we assume that one third of the 40,823 mt were acquired during that month. When the
syndicate stopped buying copper on March 1, 1889 (see Andrews, 1889, p. 513), the stock
of copper throughout the world, mostly associated to the syndicate, was not less than
177,808 mt (Day, 1890, p. 51). We use a linear interpolation to obtain monthly increases
in the copper stock from November 1887 to February 1889.
Unwinding Period: The syndicate’s stocks were disposed off gradually and in a con-
trolled manner after the breakup of the syndicate (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 76). There were
substantial agreements between producers in rolling out the stocks over a couple of years
(Andrews, 1889, p. 510; Herfindahl, 1959, p. 76). In June 1889, Paris banks still held
158,757 metric tons of copper in stocks (Andrews, 1889, p. 516). There were another
36,270 metric tons “hoarded” in the U.S. Day (1892) provides some Further details on
sales from the former syndicate’s stock into the market are available (Day, 1892, p. 72).
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Effect on Price (Narrative): Prices rose sharply in 1888. A report by the Engi-
neering and Mining Journal on January 12, 1889, showed that there has been strong
overproduction in 1888, as the high price swelled production, scraper copper appeared
and consumption was depressed (Gates, 1969, p. 79).
Unwinding Period: The syndicate collapsed in March 1889 and prices declined. Exces-
sive warehouse stocks depressed prices until fall 1892 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 77). Copper
stocks were doled out over a period of 3 to 4 years (1892-3) (Richter, 1927, p. 259).
Share in World Production: There are different estimates in the literature: Andrews
(1889, p. 509) states a 80-85% market share, as the syndicate included U.S. producers,
Rio Tinto (Spain), and the two Cape copper companies. Lenz (1910, p. 45) provides an
estimate of 78% of world production. He lists contracts with the most important producer
in Japan, producers in Venezuela, the most important producers in Australia and Chile,
the two companies in South Africa, and nearly all important North-American producers.
Andrews (1889, p. 509) and Herfindahl (1959, p. 74) mention 80-85%. The authors do
not specify whether this number relates to 1887 or 1888. I assume 80% world production
in 1888. When summing up per country data, the share of outsiders is larger than 20%.
But this might be due to the use of country instead of company data. See also discussion
in Richter (1927, p. 258).
Notes: Comptoir D’Escompe, France’s largest bank beside the Bank of France, as well as
a group of investors, including the Paris Rothschilds, provided funding (Andrews, 1889,
p. 510). The responsible manager of the Comptoir D’Escompe committed suicide when
the Comptoir D’Escompe collapsed amid a bank run (Andrews, 1889, p. 513).
Timing: There was no anticipation period. The corner was known to be formed only
at the end of 1887, when prices doubled see Andrews, 1889, p. 512. The Engineering and
Mining Journal mentions the syndicate on Dec 3, 1887 (p. 426) for the first time, and
subsequently on Dec 17 (p. 446) and on Dec 24, 1887 (p. 476).
C.2 The 1892 Agreement between the American Producers’ As-
sociation and the European Producers’ Committee
Cartel Period: Jul 1892 - July 1893 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 78)
Output Restrictions: Jul 1892 - July 1893 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 78)
Stock Accumulations: None
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Inducement: The American Producers Association was formed in 1892 and the Eu-
ropean Producers’ Committee, including the principal copper mining companies in Spain,
Portugal, Germany, the Cape Colony, Mexico and Australia, was created in the same year
(Herfindahl, 1959, p. 77). Herfindahl (1959, p. 78) states that the two associations were
“...undoubtedly...formed with an eye to collective action to restrict production when ad-
vantageous.”
Functioning: The cartel collected and disseminated data, except for 1892/1893 when
it was directly used for the purpose of restricting output (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 78).
Quantities of Output Restrictions: The cartel agreed that U.S. production should
not exceed 142,247 metric tons and exports should not exceed 40,640 metric tons. Euro-
pean producers agreed to reduce output by 5% (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 78-9). In 1893, world
output was reduced by 15,876 mt of copper according to Gates (1969, p. 83). United States
Geological Survey (1893, p. 99) provides monthly production data for the cartel members’
actual output during the period July 1892 to September 1893. The data suggest quite
some reductions among U.S. mines. These reductions also more than cover the reduced
output worldwide mentioned by Gates (1969, p. 83). U.S. producers’ output reductions
were apparently helped by the closure of the Anaconda mine for several months. There
were seemingly no major reductions among foreign mines. We use the data from United
States Geological Survey (1893, p. 99) to compute the output restrictions.
Effect on Price (Narrative): Herfindahl (1959, p. 79) concludes that it was“...doubtful
that the 1892 agreement had any important effect on the price?” However, there is strong
disagreement with other authors, who claim it was “...the first really effective world copper
combination to curtail production.” (Gates, 1969, p. 83).
Share in World Production: 75% (Gates, 1969, p. 84 and Herfindahl, 1959, p. 75).
Unwinding Period: Attempts to renew the agreement failed in 1893“...principally on ac-
count of some factors making demands which the other producers did not feel warranted
in granting.” (Herfindahl, 1959, p.80). The American Producers Association continued
operation until 1903 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 77). We could not find a formal end to the
European Producers’ Committee.
Timing: There might have been an anticipation effect. The market was already agitated
about the formation of a new cartel in March 1892 according to United States Geological
Survey (1893, p. 109). The agreement was reached at the end of June (Gates, 1969, p. 82).
Entry and Exit: The Syndicate was the only participant in the cartel. However, it
went into contracts with several major producers to purchase copper into its inventory.
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We are not aware about any information about the extend that these producers fulfilled
their contracts, but we know that the Syndicate’s inventory strongly increases during the
cartel’s existence.
Legal Status: The Syndicate’s actions were first clandestine but became public lat-
ter on. Our assessment is that the actions were legal at the time.
C.3 Amalgamated Copper Company
Cartel Period: Apr 27, 1899 - Jun 7, 1915 (Richter, 1916, p. 387)
Output Restrictions: Jan 1901 - Dec 1901 (Richter, 1916, p. 387; Herfindahl, 1959, pp.
81-3)
Stock accumulations: Dec 1900 - Dec 1901 (Richter, 1916, p. 387; Herfindahl, 1959,
pp. 81-3)
Functioning: The company was founded and directed by Standard Oil and the Rock-
efellers (Richter, 1916, pp. 288, 402). It was a centralized selling and holding company,
which included several important U.S. copper mining companies (Herfindahl, 1959, pp.
80-1). It “...dominated the United States and world copper markets through a complex
corporate network.” (Schmitz, 1986, p. 396). It imposed output restrictions and was in
involved in stock accumulations.
Quantities of Output Restrictions and Stock Accumulations: The company at-
tempted to restrict output in 1899 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 81). However, mine-level data
from Struthers (1902, p. 182) does not provide evidence for significant output reductions
in 1899 and 1900. In contrast, in 1901 output was clearly restricted by 919 metric tons
(Struthers, 1902, p. 175). In 1900, stockholding increased but not substantially (Lenz,
1910, p. 87). From the end of 1900 to the end of 1901, stockholding of the company
increased from 42,184 to 95,254 metric tons (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 82). We interpolate the
intermittent monthly stock accumulation data.
Effect on Price (Narrative): Prices rose immediately from 11-13 cents of 1898 to
17-18 cents in 1899 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 81). Prices stayed high until Dec 1901. However,
competitors undersold Amalgamated and its allies. As a consequence, the inventories of
Amalgamated went up and reached a peak in 1901. The company concluded that it could
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not hold up the prices and released copper from its inventories, which depressed prices.
Timing: There might have been an anticipation effect in 1899, when the company was
founded.
Share in World Production: 20-40% (own computation). The company controlled
about 20% of world production and cooperated with some foreign producers in 1899
(Herfindahl, 1959, p. 81). According to Gates (1969, p. 87), this referred to 95,000
tons of copper per year, which is in line with our world production data for the time. A
year later, a new company was set up which handed the sales for Amalgamated and asso-
ciated interests, totaling about 70 percent of U.S. output (Gates, 1969, p. 87). Herfindahl
(1959, pp. 124-5) has also compared the share of the cartel to world output but believes
that it was below 70 percent. The companies’ market share grew in 1901, when it acquired
Boston and Montana Mining Company and the Butte and Boston Company (Herfindahl,
1959, pp. 80).
Unwinding Period: Other producers undersold the Amalgamated Copper Company
and world output increased steadily. Amalgamated concluded in 1902 that it could not
hold the price up and there were unsuccessful attempts to negotiate output restrictions
(Herfindahl, 1959, pp. 81-2). The co-operation with other companies disintegrated com-
pletely with the demise of the American Producers’ Association in 1903 (Herfindahl, 1959,
pp. 81-3). The firm was finally liquidated in 1915, when it took over the name of one of
its subsidiaries, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company (see Herfindahl, 1959, p. 80 and
Schmitz, 1986, p. 396).
C.4 Copper Export Association
Cartel Period: Dec 1918 - 1923 (Herfindahl, 1959, pp. 93-5)
Output Restrictions: Apr 1921 - Jan 1922 (Temporary National Economic Committee,
1940, pp. 13424-13425)
Stock Accumulations: Apr 1919 - Aug 1921(Temporary National Economic Commit-
tee, 1940, p. 13429)
Functioning: As a Webb-Pomerene Institution, the association acted as a sales agent
for export sales. It also coordinated a halt in production and purchased copper into its
stockpile.
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Quantities of Output Restrictions and Stock Accumulations: The association
took over the U.S. government stockpile of 50,000 short tons in April 1919 (Herfindahl,
1959, p. 95) and purchased an additional 200,000 short tons of copper in February 1921(see
Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13429).16 The members of the asso-
ciation, except for two smaller firms, agreed to cease production from May 1921 to about
February 1922 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 94). Statistics about the unwinding of stocks and
production cessation are in Temporary National Economic Committee (1940, pp. 13424,
13425 and 13429). The data shows that firms started cutting their production in April
1919, which we take as the start month and that firms started to revert output restrictions
in February 1922. We therefore use January 1922, as the last month of cartel action. All
firms followed through according to the data.
Unwinding Period: It took mines from February until May 1920 to fully get back
to their March 1919 output. Stocks were released from September 1921 to August 1923
Temporary National Economic Committee (see 1940, p. 13429). It is not clear from the
sources what happened to the 50,000 short tons of stock that was taken over from the gov-
ernment in 1919. The association broke up in 1923 owing to “defections, price chiseling,
and outside competition” (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 95).
Timing: There was likely no anticipation effect. The association sent a letter to mem-
bers on February 3 that it will start purchasing copper immediately (Temporary National
Economic Committee, 1940, pp. 13416 and 13429). Effect on Price (Narrative): The
Copper Export Association effectively influenced the market price during its existence,
according to Herfindahl (1959, p. 95).
Share in World Production: Our own computation is 65% based on data in Temporary
National Economic Committee (1940, p. 13404). Herfindahl (1959, p. 93) estimates 89%
of U.S. production and 65% of world production in 1919.
C.5 Copper Exporters, Inc./ Copper Institute
Cartel Period: Oct 1926 - Dec 1932 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 100 and Temporary National
Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13495)
Output Restrictions: November 1930 - November 1932 (Temporary National Economic
16The data are for the first day of each month. We therefore start the cartel action in February even
though the stock data is for March 1
66
Committee, 1940, p. 13472, 13477, 13478, 13495 and Federal Trade Commission, 1947, p.
228)
Functioning: The cartel set prices with a loose, voluntary agreement to restrict out-
put. There were provisions that the relative share of members in sales remains constant.
Monetary penalties were imposed after July 1930. Both U.S. and foreign firms were in-
cluded. Selling prices outside the U.S. were determined by a New York committee after
consultation with a Brussels committee representing the foreign members. The Copper
Institute was established in 1927 to collect data and develop a system of cost accounting.
See Herfindahl (1959, pp. 100-2) for more details.
Stock Accumulations: None.
Quantities of Output Restrictions: Meetings to discuss and agree upon output curtail-
ments were held on November 3, 6, 11, and 13 (Temporary National Economic Committee,
1940, p. 13476). A press release was put out on November 14 (Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee, 1940, p. 13478). Agreed upon output restrictions totaled 23,665 short
tons (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13472, 13477), which was about
15% of world production at the time (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 105). Curtailments were vol-
untary (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13478) and there was no
common start date fixed (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13209).
We assume that the restrictions started right after the announcement. It seems that the
restrictions stayed on until higher curtailments were agreed upon. In May 1931, further
restrictions were discussed according to Herfindahl (1959, p. 105). On December 21, 1931,
the Copper Institute finally announced that producers, representing 90% of world pro-
duction, have agreed to reduce operations to a basis of approximately 26.5% of estimated
capacity in 1929 beginning January 1, 1932 (see Elliott et al., 1937, p. 574 and Temporary
National Economic Committee, 1940, pp. 13485 and 13486). To compute the quantities
of output restrictions, we use the annual average production for the year 1929 as the base
year for global production capacity following Herfindahl (1959, p. 105). This assumes
that production in 1929 was at full capacity. Finally, in March 1932 the producers met
again and producers were asked to cut their production to 20% of capacity as of April 1
(Metal Information Bureau, 1933, p. 74 and Elliott et al., 1937, p. 575). There is to our
knowledge no data on actual cartel output available.
Effect on Price (Narrative): During 1926, 1927 and possibly a part of 1928 “...it
may well be that CEI’s existence prevented prices from declining further.”(Herfindahl,
1959, pp. 103) He continues that from 1929 to April 1930 the association successfully
stabilized prices and U.S. stocks increased rapidly. The price broke in Apr 1930 owing
to price cutting by some firms.Further restrictions could not prevent a very large decline
in the price of copper, which reached about 5 cents in mid-1932 (Herfindahl, 1959, pp.
103-5). Overall, Herfindahl (1959, p. 119) describes the cartel as successful in restricting
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some output at certain periods with some effect on price.
Unwinding Period: In 1932, there was strongly growing divergence among produc-
ers, which showed up in differing views on the imposition of a U.S. import tariff on copper
(Herfindahl, 1959, p. 105). The association broke up on December 9th 1932 after no
further agreement could be agreed up on (see Temporary National Economic Committee,
1940, pp. 13495 and Metal Information Bureau, 1933, p. 75).
Share in World Production: First period: 73-90% (own computation); 65-95% of
world production according to different sources quoted in Herfindahl (1959, p. 100). De-
tailed data on member firms and their output is in U.S. Government (1941, p. 13441-61).
Pettengill (1931, p. 148) estimates 90% of world production. Second period: 90%, as it
includes Copper Exporters Inc plus several Canadian and South American Mines as well
as new Rhodesian production (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, 13486).
Third period: 48% (own computation); formal members and associated firms accounted
for 50% of world production (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 125).
Notes: American copper tariff of 4 cents per lb came into force on June 21 1932 (Metal
Information Bureau, 1933, p. 74). No information about media reports at the time. In
addition, the National Recovery Administration imposed sales quotas for U.S. producers
from April 21, 1934, until May 27, 1935, when the Industrial Recovery was invalidated
by the U.S. Supreme Court (Federal Trade Commission, 1947, p. 234). Initial quotas
are documented in Temporary National Economic Committee (1940, 13570) and Elliott
et al. (1937, p. 586-7). The aggregate maximum production level was 20,500 short tons.
However, these quotas were revised downward several times, as they proved to be too
optimistic (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 107). There is no information about how the quotas have
evolved exactly. The operating procedures were pretty complex and U.S. producers op-
posed the sales quotas. Primary U.S. copper production was roughly 20,100 short tons in
March 1934, so that the quota did not have a cutting effect. The literature suggests that
the quotas still had an effect on U.S. prices (and drove a wedge between U.S. and foreign
prices in combination with the tariff), as it dampened output increases (see Herfindahl,
1959, p. 107-8 and Elliott et al., 1937, p. 588-9).
C.6 The International Copper Cartel
Cartel Period: March 1935 - September 1939 (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 111 and Federal
Trade Commission, 1947, p. 234).
Output Restrictions: May 1935 - December 1936, December 1937 - September 1938,
January 1939 - July 1939 (Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940, p. 13434-5)
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Stock Accumulations: None
Quantities of Output Restrictions: We use data on the actual cartel output from
Temporary National Economic Committee (1940, p. 13434-5). Data on announced out-
put restrictions is also available.
Functioning: The cartel imposed production quotas and made some efforts to control
price differentials among products. Members pledged to avoid price cutting. Quotas were
only in place when there was weak demand and it seems that copper prices below 10 cents
a pound were taken as an indicator. (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 112-3)
Effect on Price (Narrative): Herfindahl (1959, p. 114) asserts that the cartel had
some effect on output, but that its effect on price were not great over the entire period.
Share in World Production: Roughly 50% of world output, including both U.S. and
foreign firms (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 111).
Anticipation: There might have been some anticipation effects. Discussions among
producers started in May 1934 (Metal Information Bureau, 1935, p. 72-3). The agree-
ment was only announced on March 28, 1935. The first output reduction started in May
1935 (see Herfindahl, 1959, p. 110 and Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940,
p. 13434). Reintroduction of curtailments in December 1937 was announced in October
1937 (Metal Information Bureau, 1938, p. 79). The decision for the reintroduction of
curtailments in January 1939 was made in December 1938. It is not clear that this was
announced ahead of time (Metal Information Bureau, 1939, p. 83).
Unwinding Period: There is no easily identifiable unwinding period, as the Second
World War broke out in September 1939.
C.7 Voluntary Production Cuts by U.S. Firms
Cartel Period: July 1962 - late 1963 (Crowson, 2007, p. 15)
Output Restrictions: July 1962 - late 1963 (Crowson, 2007, p. 15)
Stock Accumulations: None
Functioning: Voluntary production cuts; “cutbacks in production or sales were intro-
duced in mid July, both in the United States and Africa. Production was reduced by
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10-15% in Zambian mines. The cutbacks were reversed late in 1963.” (Crowson, 2007, p.
15)
Quantities of Output Restrictions: Output restrictions amounted to 10-15% of Zam-
bian mine output and included cutbacks by U.S. producers (Crowson, 2007, p. 15). Total
announced curtailments were 17,000 short tons per month (American Bureau of Metal
Statistics, 1963, p. 10). United States Geological Survey (1963, pp. 485,523) lists the fol-
lowing details: On July 11, Phelps Dodge Corp. announced a 6 percent reduction and on
September 7 a further cutback was reported; both cutbacks were equivalent to a 10 percent
reduction below pre-July levels. The Anaconda Company began a 5 percent curtailment
on July 12 at U.S. and Chilean properties, and on July 16 a 9 percent cut was introduced
by Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. Kennecott Copper Corp. announced a 10 percent
reduction effective September 9 at its Nevada and New Mexico properties, September 10 at
the Utah mine, and September 16 at the Arizona mine. Curtailment also went into effect
at the company’s Chilean properties. A 10 percent production curtailment by Northern
Rhodesian producers, in effect throughout fiscal year 1962, was increased to 15 percent in
July. To model this ramp up in production cuts, we assume an output reduction of 4,250
short tons in July 1962, an additional 4,250 short tons in August 1962 and a further re-
duction of 8,500 short tons in September 1962. Reductions are reversed in December 1963.
Effect on Price (narrative): The collusive action reduced oversupply and helped sta-
bilize prices according to Edelstein (1999, p. 39).
Share in World Production: 38% (own computation derived from data on primary
production in Zaire, South Africa, U.S., South Rhodesia, and Zambia from Schmitz (1986).
Anticipation: We could not find information on the timing of decision making.
C.8 Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
(CIPEC)
Cartel Period: June 8 1967 - 1988 ((Nappi, 1979, p. 103)
Output Restrictions: December 1, 1974 - June 30, 1976 (United States Geological
Survey, 1975, p. 499 and United States Geological Survey, 1976, p. 565)
Stock Accumulations: None
Functioning: The organization used export quotas, which were effectively production
cutbacks, according (Mikesell, 1979, p. 106 and United States Geological Survey, 1976, p.
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565). The organization served as forum for discussion and dissemination of information.
There was ongoing nationalization of copper mines in some member countries (see Nappi,
1979, p. 103). Some of the discussions on stabilizing copper markets were absorbed by
UNCTAD’s conferences on commodity markets (United States Geological Survey, 1976,
p. 565).
Quantities of Output Restrictions: On November 19, 1974, CIPEC announced that,
for the six months following December 1, 1974, its member countries would reduce monthly
exports by 10% from earlier 1974 levels (United States Geological Survey, 1975, p. 499).
In a meeting from April 9 to 11, 1975, CIPEC decided to raised the quota applied to mem-
ber countries to 15% starting on April 15. We compute the monthly restrictions based
on data for CIPEC countries for the year 1974 from American Bureau of Metal Statistics
(mes ). There are no data on actual output restrictions available at the monthly level.
Unwinding Period: After the end of output restrictions on June 30, 1976, member
countries could not agree on further production curtailments (Nappi, 1979, p. 114, 116
and United States Geological Survey, 1977, p. 336).
Effect on Price: The cartel was “not fully observed” and “unsuccessful in stimulating a
price rise” according to Mikesell (1979, pp. 187-215). “The effects of this first intervention
were very modest...” concludes Nappi (1979, p. 104).
Share in World Production: 21-23% (based on our own computation). Initial mem-
bers were Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia. Since 1975 Australia, Mauritania, Papua New
Guinea became associated members and Yugoslavia and Indonesia became full members.
The association controlled about 37% of world mine output in 1975 according to Radetzki
(2008, p. 158) (see also discussion in Nappi, 1979, p. 114). My computation show that it
is less in terms of refined production.
Notes: Some functions of the CIPEC such as data dissemination were continued by
the International Copper Study Group formed in 1993 (see Radetzki, 2008, p. 158).
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